Investigating the Integration of Acquired Firms in High-technology Industries: Implications for Industrial Policy by King, David R. & Driessnack, John D.
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Management Faculty Research and Publications Management, Department of
7-1-2003
Investigating the Integration of Acquired Firms in
High-technology Industries: Implications for
Industrial Policy
David R. King
Marquette University
John D. Driessnack
USAF
Published version. Acquisition Review Quarterly, pp 260-283 (Summer, 2003). Permalink. © 2003
Acquisition Review Quarterly. Used with permission.
David R. King was affiliated with the U.S. Air Force at the time of publication.
Acquisition Review Quarterly — Summer 2003
260
Report Documentation Page Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it
does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 
1. REPORT DATE 
2003 
2. REPORT TYPE 
N/A 
3. DATES COVERED 
  -   
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
Investigating the Integration of Acquired Firms in High-Technology
Industries: Implications for Industrial Policy 
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b. GRANT NUMBER 
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 
5e. TASK NUMBER 
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Defense Acquisition University Alumni Association 2550 Huntington Ave,
Suite 202 Alexandria, VA 22303 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER 
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 
NUMBER(S) 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 
14. ABSTRACT 
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 
ABSTRACT 
UU 
18. NUMBER
OF PAGES 
24 
19a. NAME OF
RESPONSIBLE PERSON 
a. REPORT 
unclassified 
b. ABSTRACT 
unclassified 
c. THIS PAGE 
unclassified 
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 
Investigating the Integration of Acquired Firms in High-technology Industries
261
OPINION
INVESTIGATING THE INTEGRATION
OF ACQUIRED FIRMS IN
HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR INDUSTRIAL POLICY
Maj David R. King, USAF and Lt Col John D. Driessnack, USAF
 Acquisition activity persists despite evidence that acquisitions do not improve
firm performance. Further, government policy toward the defense industry has
advocated consolidation in the name of nominal cost savings. We explore the
role acquisitions play toward technology transfer and begin to identify factors
associated with acquisition success through a review of existing research on
post-acquisition performance that primarily considers acquiring firm stock
performance. Using this research as a foundation, we build a model to analyze
post-acquisition performance using a sample of high-technology firms. Results
suggest critical success factors associated with post-acquistion stock
performance are poorly understood. We conclude that proactive government
policy toward high-technology industry mergers and acquisitions may be
misguided due to difficulty in predicting acquisition outcomes.
in industry may carry higher stakes in
high-technology industries, because high-
technology firms are an important source
of U.S. economic competitiveness and are
key components of the defense industrial
base.
The Department of Defense (DoD)
encouraged merger and acquisition
(M&A) activity after then Deputy Sec-
DISCLAIMER
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
Merger and acquisition activity involves discrete events associatedwith a high tempo of change that
modify the competitive dynamics of
affected industries. Merged firms combine
additional resources and capacity that can
threaten the market position and profitabil-
ity of remaining firms. The implications
of using acquisitions to alter competition
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retary of Defense William Perry told
defense industry executives that declin-
ing defense spending required consoli-
dation. The 1993 meeting became
known as the “Last Supper” and in the
next four years the
value of defense merg-
ers was eight times the
level of the preceding
four years (Augustine,
1997). In a controversial
program that became to
be known as payoffs
for layoffs, the DoD, in
an effort to help realize
expected cost savings, reimbursed de-
fense firms for the cost of merging. The
program, to date, has resulted in $4.77
billion in DoD savings with a corre-
sponding cost of $869 million
(Department of Defense [DoD], 2002), or
approximately one percent of the 2003
defense budget.
Firms pursue acquisitions to increase
performance (Finkelstein, 1997); however,
research findings on the impact of an
acquisition on acquiring firm performance
remains inconclusive (e.g., Haspeslagh &
Jemison, 1991; Sirower, 1997). Given the
high level and dollar of acquisition activ-
ity, research needs to identify factors
associated with acquisition success. The
goal of the current paper is to begin to
answer the following policy questions:
1. Does technology transfer occur when
high-technology firms are acquired?
2. Is it reasonable to anticipate investor
benefits from defense industry
consolidation?
TECHNOLOGY AS A MOTIVATION
FOR ACQUISITIONS
Acquiring technology is often the
motivation for acquiring another firm. In
reviewing the different perspectives
toward acquiring technology, two conflict-
ing perspectives dominate. Researchers
tend to either view external technology as
a substitute for Barkema and Vermeulen
(1998) Bower (2001) or a complement to
Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) internal
innovation. Either view has implications
for technology transfer.
In the current sample1, the average
research and development (R&D) inten-
sity for acquiring firms was significantly
below the average for firms in their
industry (p < .001), suggesting that firms
use acquisitions as a substitute for R&D or
that acquired technology is used as a sub-
stitute for internal innovation.
However, acquirers still perform R&D
and it may provide a facilitating role to ac-
quiring external technology. This idea re-
lates to the concept of absorptive capac-
ity, or the ability of a firm to recognize,
assimilate, and convert new information
to commercial ends, that is built up through
R&D investment (Cohen & Levinthal,
1989, 1990). If firms acquire high-tech-
nology firms for the express purpose of
assimilating a target firm’s technology,
there are clear implications for the acquisi-
tion of U.S. companies by foreign firms.
For example, ASM Lithography Hold-
ing NV, a Dutch company, and its May 2001
acquisition of Silicon Valley Group (SVG)
Inc. was delayed, because of national-se-
curity issues with a SVG subsidiary, Tinsley,
which makes lens polishing technology for
chip equipment, satellites, and missile
“Acquiring
technology
is often the
motivation
for acquiring
another firm.”
Investigating the Integration of Acquired Firms in High-technology Industries
263
guidance systems (Clark & Simpson,
2001). However, the acquisition was
later approved and completed in May
2001 with the caveat ASM Lithography
try to divest Tinsley over a six month
period (Simpson, 2001).2
Without national security issues the
acquisition of SVG would have been
approved, because the Exon-Florio for-
eign acquisition law does not allow for
consideration of economic issues (Simp-
son, 2001). Foreign firms accounted for
approximately five percent of the acqui-
sitions of U.S. high-technology firms
between 1994 and 1997, and this may be
an area for expanding anti-trust policy. The
impact of the technology transferred on
U.S. economic competitiveness is un-
known, and represents an opportunity for
additional research.
FACTORS COMMONLY ASSOCIATED
WITH ACQUISITION SUCCESS
Similar to previous studies, the current
sample of acquisitions, on average, did not
lead to abnormal returns for acquiring firms.
However, some acquisitions performed bet-
ter than others, so what factors are associ-
ated with acquisition success? A literature
review of 46 empirical studies of post-ac-
quisition performance published since
Jensen and Ruback’s (1983) review identi-
fied little overlap in the studies that research-
ers considered important in explaining post-
acquisition performance.3 We include the
most commonly studied variables in our
analysis to avoid statistical artifacts from
missing variables. The logic behind the most
commonly studied variables, the generally
anticipated impact of each variable on
post-acquisition performance, and their
significance in the current study are
shown in Table 1. The following sections
further discuss this material.
DIVERSIFICATION
The impact of firm diversification on
subsequent performance has received the
most attention of researchers with some
measure of relatedness considered in 30
of the 46 studies. Diversification involves
whether a firm acquires another firm in
its same industry, a related acquisition, or
a firm in a different industry. Although
no relationship between acquiring a re-
lated versus an unrelated firm and post-
acquisition performance has been found
in some studies (e.g., Fowler & Schmidt,
1989), the preponderance of literature
suggests acquiring related firms leads to
increased post-acquisition performance
(e.g., Kusewitt, 1985).
Current results are consistent with
existing research in that the acquisition of
related targets leads to higher post-acqui-
sition performance (p < .05; one-tail). How-
ever, the observed rela-
tionship is relatively
weak with the degree
that a target firm relates
to an acquirer only ex-
plaining 2.1 percent of
subsequent stock market
performance. Still, the
results support viewing
technological progress
as largely path depen-
dent with the implication
that acquiring firms are more likely to
search and find value in target firms in ar-
eas related to their existing technological
capabilities. The possiblity of increased per-
formance may depend on a firm staying
in a related industry.
“Diversification
involves whether
a firm acquires
another firm in
its same industry,
a related acquisi-
tion, or a firm in
a different
industry.”
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Table 1. Common Post-Acquisition Performance Research Variables
Variable Anticipated Impact on Performance Current Findings a
Diversification Diversification (e.g., acquiring firms in non-related Expected impact is
industries) is expected to have a negative impact on supported (p < .05) and
performance (see Berger & Ofek, 1995). explains 2.1% of the
variance in performance.
Relative Size The acquisition of smaller firms, in comparison to the Expected impact is
of Firms  acquiring firm, is expected to be easier and result in supported (p < .01) and
higher performance (see Kusewitt,1985). explains 7.2% of the
variance in performance.
Acquisition Acquisition experience is generally considered to Expected impact is not
Experience positively impact performance (see Hitt, Harrison, supported (p = .22).
& Ireland, 2001).
Method of Purchase accounting is generally considered to have Expected impact is not
Accounting  a positive impact on performance (see Ravenscraft supported (p = .15).
& Scherer, 1987).
R&D R&D expenditures should improve post-acquisition Expected impact is not
Expenditures performance (see Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990). supported (p = .41).
Friendliness Friendly acquisitions are expected to lead to higher Not examined due to an
of Acquisition performance (see Kusewitt, 1985). insufficient occurrence of
hostile high-technology
acquisitions.
Debt Level Firms with lower debt levels are more likely to Expected impact is
experience higher performance (see Haspeslagh supported (p < .05), and
& Jemison, 1991). explains 3.0% of the
variance in performance.
Form of Tender offers, in contrast to mergers, lead to higher Expected impact is
Acquisition performance (see Berkovitch & Khanna, 1991). supported (p < .10), and
explains 1.8% of the
variance in performance.
Target Firm There are conflicting perspectives on how target firm Current results suggest
Performance performance will impact an acquiring firm’s post- that acquiring firm
acquisition performance. Researchers support profitability is not related
viewing post-acquisition performance as independent to post-acquisition
of target firm performance (Anand & Singh, 1997), performance (p = .15).
distressed targets leading to higher performance
(Bruton, Oviatt, & White, 1994), or profitable targets
leading to higher performance (Mahoney & Pandian,
1992).
a
 One-tail tests of significance.
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“…Defense
firms appear to
have generally
chosen to focus
on acquiring other
firms in defense
industry and not
expanding into
commerical
markets.”
In constrast to this finding, defense
firms that are prime contractors have
tended to make acquisitions that both
consolidate specific industries (e.g., air-
craft and Lockheed’s purchase of Gen-
eral Dynamic’s aerospace unit) as well
as across industries (e.g., aircraft and
ships with Northrop Grumman’s pur-
chase of Newport News Shipbuilding).
However, defense firms appear to have
generally chosen to focus on acquiring
other firms in defense industry and not
expanding into commerical markets. It
is possible that the specialization of de-
fense firms in relating to their unique
customer, the government, provides
them an advantage that does not corre-
spond to traditional industry boundaries.
RELATIVE SIZE OF FIRMS
The ability of an acquiring firm to
assimilate a target firm may be impacted
by their relative size simply because it is
easier for a larger firm to integrate
resources from a smaller firm. Kitching
(1967) found that unsuccessful acquisi-
tions correlated strongly between firms of
similar size. Acquisition risk may be re-
duced if the target firm is large enough to
achieve ‘critical mass’ while remaining
smaller than the acquiring firm (Kusewitt,
1985), due to decreased financial strain
and integrative effort. Existing research
suggests that, in general, acquisitions of
smaller firms by larger firms should lead
to higher performance.
Current results indicate that larger
targets correlate with higher stock
gains (p < .01; one tail) and explain 7.2
percent of the observed variance in post-
acquisition performance. However, over
98 percent of the targets were still smaller
than the acquiring firm. This result appears
to confirm previous research that acqui-
sition risk is reduced when a target is
smaller than an acquiring firm, but large
enough to demand enough management
attention to ensure proper integration.
For acquisitions involving large, prime
defense contractors, targets from this
point forward will most likely be smaller
than the prime defense contractors. This
suggests a potential post-acquisition per-
formance advantage for prime contrac-
tors in the defense industry.
ACQUISITION EXPERIENCE
Experience from past acquisitions, at the
organizational level, may build facilitating
processes for the identification and inte-
gration of target firm resources that may
be required to improve post-acquisition
performance (Haspeslagh & Jemison,
1991). However, consistent findings on the
relationship between ac-
quisition experience and
post-acquisition perfor-
mance do not exist. Still,
Hitt, Harrison, and Ire-
land (2001) caution “the
importance of the link
between managerial ex-
perience and M&A suc-
cess should not be un-
derestimated (p. 55).”
Current results sug-
gest that either high-
technology acquisi-
tions are unique with acquisition ex-
perience not predicting post-acquisi-
tion performance (p = .22; one tail).
Alternatively, this result may imply that
firms could benefit from acquisition ex-
perience, and that managers simply
treat acquisitions as unique events.
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METHOD OF ACCOUNTING
Few studies control for accounting
method, even though it has been shown to
impact firm performance measures
(Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). Histori-
cally, there have been two methods of
accounting for an acquisition — pooling
of interests or purchase.4 Under pooling
of interests, assets of an acquired firm
are recorded at their pre-merger book
value and the difference in amount paid
for a firm is either deb-
ited or credited to
acquirer’s stockhold-
ers equity account.
Under purchase ac-
counting, acquired as-
sets are entered at the
effective price paid.
Pooling of interest ac-
counting is signifi-
cantly associated with
higher acquisition pre-
miums (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987)
and the premium paid negatively im-
pacts post-acquisition performance
(Sirower, 1997). Current results suggest
that method of accounting does not
impact post-acquisition performance
(p = .15; one-tail).
R&D EXPENDITURE
Research suggests that increased tech-
nological capability enables firms to be
aware of the significance of new external
technology (Berry & Taggart, 1998). Nel-
son and Winter (1978) argue that the
capacity to recognize and exploit techno-
logical opportunities is a function of a
firm’s technology resource commitments,
such as R&D investments, and that firms
that track the progress of technology
tend to prosper. R&D investments build
internal technological capabilities that
help firms adapt to changing markets
(Zahra & Covin, 1993). Additionally,
more R&D intensive firms should be
more proactive in exploiting external op-
portunities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).
However, current results suggest that
there may be diminishing returns to
performing R&D beyond some thresh-
old level. In other words, firms may only
need to perform enough R&D to remain
aware of external technology and main-
tain the ability to absorb needed tech-
nological developments.
FRIENDLINESS OF ACQUISITIONS
Friendly acquisitions involve transac-
tions where an acquiring firm’s overtures
are not resisted by a target firm’s top man-
agement. Theory suggests friendly acqui-
sition should lead to higher performance.
For example, Kusewitt (1985) simply
stated: “unfriendly takeovers should be
avoided (p. 166).” Consequently, hostile
acquisitions are relatively infrequent with
only 172 hostile acquisitions out of over
35,000 completed between 1976 and 1990
(Jensen, 1993). Therefore, whether an
acquisition was friendly is not included
in the current analysis, due to a lack of
observed hostile acquisitions.
DEBT LEVEL
The debt of an acquiring firm may
impact post-acquisition performance.
Unused debt capacity can be regarded as
a firm resource (Haspeslagh & Jemison,
1991), and if an acquiring firm cannot
afford the price demanded by a target, the
anticipated synergies in a combined com-
pany cannot be achieved. Additionally,
higher debt levels may lead to more
strict financial controls that can decrease
“Friendly
acquisitions
involve transac-
tions where an
acquiring firm’s
overtures are not
resisted by a
target firm’s top
management.”
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performance (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson,
& Moesel, 1996). Present results sug-
gest that firms with less debt experience
higher subsequent performance (p < .05;
one tail) with debt explaining three per-
cent of the variance in an acquiring
firm’s post-acquisition performance. It
appears that increased debt levels repre-
sent an additional burden for acquiring
firms seeking increased performance.
This represents a challenge for most
defense firms since they carry relatively
large levels of debt and poor credit rat-
ings (Defense Science Board, 2000).
FORM OF ACQUISITION
The form of an acquisition involves
the nature of the offer made by an ac-
quiring firm with the primary choices
involving either a tender offer or a
merger  Berkovitch & Khanna, 1991).
Tender offers, or proposals made di-
rectly to a target firm’s shareholders, are
made through public bids, while merg-
ers, or negotiations directly with a tar-
get firm’s managers, are generally initi-
ated under a veil of secrecy. Existing
research has found that tender offers
significantly outperform mergers (Rau
& Vermealen, 1998). Berkovitch and
Khanna (1991) propose that the differ-
ence in performance results from dif-
ferences in the amount of information
made public during a tender offer ver-
sus a merger, where the greater infor-
mation disclosure in tender offers leads
increased synergy. The basis of
Berkovitch and Khanna’s (1991) argu-
ment is that tender offers lead to greater
competition for a target firm. However,
an alternate explanation relevant to the
acquisition of technology resources is
that the increased information disclosure
of tender offers decreases the amount of
uncertainty target firm employees’
experience.
Acquisitions create uncertainty for em-
ployees in target firms leading to a ten-
dency toward self-preservation that inhib-
its transfer of capabilities and resources
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Em-
ployee resistance to integration is particu-
larly relevant in the assimilation of the
technology resources because the implicit
expertise of R&D personnel is far more
valuable than the technology they have
developed (Bower, 2001).
Whatever the ultimate
reason, acquisitions com-
pleted through a tender
offer are expected to be
positively related to post-
acquisition performance.
Current results suggest
that tender offers do lead
to higher post-acquisition
performance (p < .10;
one tail) with form of ac-
quisition explaining 1.8
percent of the variance in
post-acquisition perfor-
mance. This result supports either ten-
der offers resulting in increased compe-
tition or information disclosure leads to
increased post-acquisition performance.
TARGET FIRM PERFORMANCE
 It seems reasonable that would-be
acquirers will evaluate the attractiveness
of a target firm’s resources in light of the
firm’s performance. However, consistent
guidance on the expected relationship
does not exist. There are at least three
possible relationships between target firm
performance and an acquiring firm’s
post-acquisition performance.
“It appears
that increased
debt levels
represent an
additional burden
for acquiring
firms seeking
increased
performance.”
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First, acquiring firm’s may view target
firm profitability as a signal of the value
attached to its technological resources by
would-be acquirers. Specifically, it is pos-
sible that would-be acquirers will inter-
pret positive profitability as the market’s
independent verification that the target
firm possesses valuable resources. High
profits signal uncertain imitability and the
more firm specific or rare a firm’s re-
sources, the more likely the firm will earn
above normal rates of return (Mahoney
& Pandian, 1992). Therefore, higher post-
acquisition performance may result from
acquiring target firms that possess valu-
able resource combinations indicated by
higher profitability.
The second possibility is that, con-
sistent with Bruton, Oviatt, and White’s
(1994) observations, acquirers are particu-
larly attracted to dis-
tressed firms with
resources of known or
potential value to the
acquirer. The assump-
tion here is that the tar-
get firm’s poor financial
performance is a reflec-
tion of either resource
mismanagement or the
absence of comple-
mentary resources needed to create
competitive advantage. Thus, the acqui-
sition of a poorly performing firm may
be attractive if the acquiring firm as-
sumes it can improve the management
of the target firm’s resources or success-
fully combine them with its own, pre-
existing internal resources.
Third, it may be that target firm prof-
itability has no impact on an acquiring
firm’s post-acquisition performance.
Anand and Singh (1997) suggest that
the benefit of transferring firm resources
in an acquisition is independent of the
acquired firm’s prior performance.
Therefore, in their opinion, acquiring
firms should seek targets with resources
they need without considering the prof-
itability of the firms employing those
resources. Current results indicate that
target firm profitability in the year prior
to an acquisition is not related to post-
acquisition performance by an acquiring
firm (p = .15; one tail). This implies that
acquiring firms consider both distressed
and highly profitable firms as potential
acquisition candidates.
IMPACT OF EXTERNAL FORCES ON
ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE
The vast majority of acquisition re-
search and the variables discussed so far
only consider the impact of variables
linked to factors internal to firms that can
be directly observed and to some extent
controlled. However, it is also reason-
able that post-acquisition performance
depends on factors external to firms.
We consider two characteristics that
may influence post-acquisition perfor-
mance. First, an acquiring firm’s envi-
ronment is important because it sets the
competitive context, and rivalry over
scarce environmental resources and op-
portunities should influence firm actions
and subsequent performance. Industry
characteristics can influence the perfor-
mance of firms (Porter, 1985). Further,
Bergh (1998) found the benefits of ex-
ternal technology were moderated by a
firm’s environment. Second, the timing
of an acquisition may impact an acquir-
ing firm’s post-acquisition performance.
“…acquiring
firms consider
both distressed
and highly
profitable firms
as potential
acquisition
candidates.”
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The impact of variables related to both
external factors on subsequent post-ac-
quisition performance is summarized in
Table 2. The following sections further
discuss these relationships.
FIRM ENVIRONMENT
Research supports viewing a firm’s
environment as a multidimensional con-
struct with three dimensions — munifi-
cence, dynamism, and complexity (e.g.,
Dess & Beard, 1984). Although the la-
bels applied to the different dimensions
vary, there is an underlying commonal-
ity in the underlying concepts. For the
Table 2. External Forces Influencing Post-Acquisition Performance
Variable Anticipated Impact on Performance Current Findings a
Firm Firms operating in more attractive
Environment environments should experience higher
performance (see Dess & Beard, 1984).
1. Acquiring firms operating in 1. Munificence does not impact
munificent environments are more post-acquisition performance
likely to experience higher (p = .28).
performance.
2. Acquiring firms operating in less 2. Dynamism does not impact
dynamic environments are more post-acquisition performance
likely to experience higher  (p = .42).
performance.
3. Acquiring firms operating in less 3. Complexity is significant
complex environments are more (p < .05) and explains 2.4 %
likely to experience higher of post-acquisition performance.
performance.
Timing of Early acquisitions should outperform Mixed support, but the year an
Acquisition later acquisitions. acquisition was completed explained
4.7 % of post-acquisition
performance.
a
 One-tail tests of significance
purposes of the present research, the ef-
fects of industry are controlled by com-
puting firm measures relative to their
four-digit Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion (SIC) code using the procedures
described by Keats and Hitt (1988).
Munificence relates to the scarceness
of environment resources that support
firm growth in a given industry (Dess &
Beard, 1984). This environmental dimen-
sion has been discussed within the popu-
lation ecology literature under the label
of environmental carrying capacity
(Aldrich, 1979). Munificence is charac-
teristically assumed to have a positive
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impact on firm performance and is cal-
culated from changes in an industry’s
net sales and operating income during
the preceding five-year period.
Current results find that munificence is
not significant (p = .28; one tail) in
explaining an acquiring firm’s post-acqui-
sition performance. From the perspective
of the 1990’s defense industry consolida-
tion, this means that post-acquisition per-
formance may be inde-
pendent of whether an
acquiring firm’s industry
is contracting. From the
perspective of 1990’s
defense industry con-
solidation, defense firms
should have been able to
adjust operations to sus-
tain performance in face
of DoD spending that in
2001 dollars declined
nearly 18 percent for R&D and 56 percent
for procurement between 1987 and 2000
(DoD, 2000).
Dynamism corresponds to uncertainty
or the degree of instability and unpredict-
able change in an industry (Dess & Beard,
1984). Environmental change itself does not
imply dynamism, instead dynamism exists
when change cannot be anticipated and ad-
equately predicted, creating a situation where
integration and coordination are more diffi-
cult. Williamson (1975) suggests that un-
der increasing environmental uncertainty
higher quality information could be
gained by managing transactions inter-
nally (i.e., making an acquisition). Current
results suggest that industry volatility in and
of itself does not impact post-acquisition
performance (p = .42; one tail). One
intrepretation of this result is that firms
adopt acquisition activity as a tool to
adapt to environmental change that helps
firms ensure their continued survival.
This is particularily relevant to the de-
fense industry consolidation witnessed
during the 1990s.5
Complexity relates to the number and
diversity of other organizations a firm
must interact with (Dess & Beard, 1984).
Complexity is reflected in such factors as
the breadth and variety of a firm’s geogra-
phic markets, customers, suppliers, and
competitors. In general, fragmented indus-
tries are regarded as more complex than
concentrated industries (Keats & Hitt, 1988).
In an environment with fewer competitors,
rivalry often plays a coordinating role that
imposes competitive discipline on an
industry (Keats & Hitt, 1988). In contrast,
market power and resources are relatively
widely and evenly distributed among
numerous firms in fragmented industries,
creating heterogeneous conditions involv-
ing intense rivalry. Thus, the dynamics of
industry concentration may impact the
motivation and resulting performance
resulting from absorbing recognized
external technological capabilities.
Current results indicate that less com-
plex (i.e., more concentrated industries)
lead to higher post-acquisition perfor-
mance (p < .05; one tail). At first glance,
this result suggests that continued consoli-
dation of the defense industry may be a
mistake in that further consolidation, at
this point, would result in two or fewer
prime contractors for primary weapon
system platforms (e.g., ships, aircraft,
tanks, satellites, missiles, etc.). Typically
this situation would raise concerns about
the ability of industry to retain either
enough competition or sustain innovation.
However, any monopolistic power in
defense firms is compensated by their
“In an
environment
with fewer com-
petitors, rivalry
often plays a
coordinating
role that imposes
competitive
discipline on
an industry.”
Investigating the Integration of Acquired Firms in High-technology Industries
271
facing a monopsony, or market with only
having a single customer (e.g., the DoD).
Additionally, the government audits the
cost of defense contracts and limits the
profit defense firms can earn from them.
It is unclear whether continued con-
solidation in the defense industry and any
anti-competitive impacts should be a
concern. Still, whether additional consoli-
dation of defense firms occurs or not,
rationalization of production capacity
should be considered. Despite industry con-
solidation at the end of the 1990s, every
one of the eight military aircraft lines and
five military helicopter lines open at the
end of the Cold War were still in produc-
tion (Sapolsky & Gholz, 1999). To a large
extent, the facilities responsible for produc-
ing 5, 195 F-4 Phantom II aircraft (Boeing,
2002) and other Cold War era weapons
continue to be maintained. Not even the
most optimistic projections predict the
same number of models or quantities of
future aircraft will be produced due largely
to improvements in capability6 and in-
creased emphasis on jointness.
TIMING OF ACQUISITION
One possible explanation of an acquir-
ing firm’s post-acquisition performance
consistent with population ecology
(Aldrich, 1979) is that early acquisitions
should outperform later acquisitions. An
acquisition represents an entry decision
for an acquiring firm that may involve
”selection” of firms with better resources
(Anand & Singh, 1997). Therefore, early
acquirers may be able to “select” the best
targets and later acquirers have a de-
creased and less desirable pool of targets
to select from. Although the timing of an
acquisition has been previously found to
be significant (Fowler & Schmidt, 1988),
few studies include time as an explana-
tory power and only Shelton (1988), in a
study of the impact of changing antitrust
regulations, attempts to explain time
differences in acquisition performance.
Current results suggest that the timing
of an acquisition is significant (p < .10) in
explaining an acquiring firm’s performance.
Based on one-tail significance tests, ac-
quisitions completed in 1995 (p < .10) and
1996 (p < .05) performed significantly
worse than the 1994 ref-
erence category. How-
ever, the performance of
acquisitions completed in
1997 is not significantly
different from acquisi-
tions completed in 1994.
The results would appear
to show mixed support
for early acquisitions out-
performing later acquisi-
tions. However, the nature
of the cross-sectional regression employed
assumes that the underlying pool of firms
does not change. There is significant turn-
over in high-technology industries with firms
both entering and exiting the market. The
non-significant difference between 1994 and
1997 may have resulted from the ability of
acquiring firms to select from a relatively di-
verse pool of targets in both years. Further
studying the impact of acquisition timing on
performance represents an opportunity for
future research.
CONCLUSION
In regard to the first research question,
there is clear evidence that firms use
acquisitions as a tool to gain access to tech-
nology. This finding has implications for
acquisitions of U.S. technology firms by
“It is unclear
whether contin-
ued consolidation
in the defense
industry and any
anti-competitive
impacts should
be a concern.”
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foreign firms. Only national security and
not economic security reasons provide
grounds for disapproving an acquisition by
a foreign firm under the Exon-Florio for-
eign acquisition law. It is reported that the
DoD is considering cross-Atlantic defense
industry consolidation (Urwitz, 1999).
Based on the potential technology trans-
fer implications and the demonstrated dif-
ficulty in predicting post-acquisition out-
comes, encouraging cross-Atlantic defense
industry consolidation to realize cost sav-
ings may be misguided.
In regard to the second research ques-
tion, acquisitions, on average, do not im-
prove acquiring firm stock performance.
Completed analysis indicates that several
factors are correlated
with higher post-acquisi-
tion stock performance.
However, only four of the
factors commonly asso-
ciated with acquisition
performance that are un-
der the control of man-
gers appear to impact
post-acquisition stock
performance. First, the
acquisition of target firms
in related industries ap-
pears to improve post-ac-
quisition performance.
Second, the acquisition
of targets that remain smaller than an ac-
quiring firm, but are still of a sufficient
size, leads to higher post-acquisition per-
formance. Third, acquiring firms that
carry lower debt levels are more likely to
experience higher post-acquisition perfor-
mance. Fourth, acquisitions completed
using tender offers lead to higher perfor-
mance. Combined, these four factors
explain only 12 percent of the observed
variance in post-acquisition performance.
This is consistent with existing acquisi-
tion research that in general explains “less
than 10 percent” of the variance in the
stock performance of acquiring firms
(Sirower, 1997, p. 158). Clearly the dollar
value and volume of acquisition activity
requires a better understanding of this phe-
nomenon. Therefore, we also considered
the impact of external factors on post-
acquisition stock performance.
External factors relating to an acquir-
ing firm’s industry munificence and tim-
ing of an acquisition explain 7.1 percent
of the variance in post-acquisition stock
performance. Stated differently, 37.2 per-
cent of the explained variance in the cur-
rent study is due to external factors that
are beyond direct control and the major-
ity of variance still remains unexplained
after including the most common factors
in M&A research in our model. In total,
this study only explains 19.1 percent
(F = 2.12; p = .015) of the variance in
post-acquisition performance. This
means that the majority of variance in
post-acquisition stock performance re-
mains unexplained and suggests that
government policy aimed at influenc-
ing high-technology M&A activity may
be misguided since any government
intervention may have opposite the de-
sired effect. Additionally, antitrust poli-
cies in high-technology industries may
be less relevant because the high rate
of technology change may keep firms
from establishing and exercising mo-
nopoly powers.
In regard to defense industry con-
solidation, results indicate it is not rea-
sonable to expect consolidation will
“In regard to
defense industry
consolidation,
results indicate it
is not reasonable
to expect consoli-
dation will
achieve signifi-
cant benefits
in firm stock
performance.”
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achieve significant benefits in firm
stock performance. Although consider-
ations of defense industry stock perfor-
mance may be secondary to the gov-
ernments interests in the short-term, it
is of concern in the long-term because
it impacts the attractiveness of the in-
dustry to employees and investors. The
long-term success and health of the de-
fense industry requires attracting the best
employees (Defense Science Board,
2000) and maintaining the ability of
defense firms to utilize the capital
markets. However, a significant portion
of high-technology firm employees comes
from stock options, and poor performing
defense firms would be less able to attract
and retain the best engineers. Consider-
ing additional performance measures for
the defense industry represents an opportu-
nity for future research.
In closing, the present research reviews
current post-acquisition stock perfor-
mance literature to test factors impacting
the post-acquisition stock performance of
firms that acquire high-technology targets.
Results of the study show that internal and
extenal factors do not provide a clear
guidance for managers or government
policy makers. Additional research, es-
pecially focused on the defense industry
and its unique market, is needed if fac-
tors are to be found that can be used to
influence industrial policy.
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Existing literature commonly recognizes
seven two-digit industry sectors as high-
technology industries: Chemicals [28],
Computer Equipment [35], Electronics
[36], the aerospace industry [Transporta-
tion: 37], Instruments [38], Communica-
tions [48], and the software industry [Busi-
ness Services: 73] (e.g., Certo, Daily, &
Dalton, 2001). Moderate R&D intensity
was operationally defined as R&D-to-
Sales of two percent or greater. This value
was based on rounding up from what has
been reported as the overall industry av-
erage R&D-to-Sales figure of 1.5 percent
(e.g., Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). This
enabled us to conservatively and objec-
tively identify target firms as reasonably
R&D intensive without unduly restrict-
ing the sample. After applying these
screens, a census of 312 high-technology
firms was identified.
To identify the final sample, however,
two additional restrictions were applied.
First, acquisitions were eliminated if the
target and acquiring firms’ SIC codes
were not identified by COMPUSTAT to
the four-digit SIC level. This controlled
for industry effects and allowed the use
of a categorical entropy diversification
measure for firm relatedness. It also
offered the benefit of controlling for
potential confounding effects of conglom-
erate firms. Second, acquiring firms had
to be available in the Center for Research
on Security Prices (CRSP) database to al-
low us to calculate several of our measures
(e.g., Jensen’s alpha, the premium paid,
and relative size). The final sample
includes 133 firm pairs.
This appendix describes in detail the
research methodology used beginning
with the sample. The discussion of the
sample is followed by a description of
the operationalization of all variables
and their data sources. Finally, the sta-
tistical procedure is summarized.
SAMPLE
The sample used for this study focused
on public, high-technology firms that
were acquired between January 1, 1994
and December 31, 1997 and had a mar-
ket capitalization of at least $10 million.
This focus enabled us to isolate acquisi-
tions of a specific type and to avoid study-
ing a cross-section of merger and acqui-
sition (M&A) activity that may introduce
extraneous effects. Additionally, the time
frame offered control over known impacts
of the business cycle on acquisition ac-
tivity (Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989)
by ensuring all measurement was limited
to a period of favorable economic condi-
tions. A $10 million market capitalization
restriction is consistent with the lower
bound observed in previous acquisition
research (e.g., Finkelstein, 1997;
Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987) and was
intended to ensure target firms were
large enough to impact acquiring firm
performance.
High-technology target firms were
identified as those that (1) were in two-
digit Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) code industries commonly recog-
nized as high-technology, and (2) dis-
played moderate research and develop-
ment (R&D) intensity prior to being acquired.
APPENDIX: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
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MEASURES
This section explains the operationali-
zation for each variable beginning with
the dependent stock performance vari-
able, and then the explanatory variables
in the order they are discussed in the pa-
per.
Firm Performance. Jensen’s alpha
(Alexander & Francis, 1986), a variation
of the two-parameter market model, was
used to measure an acquiring firm’s
performance. For each month after an
acquisition (t = 1 to 36), the regression
model shown in Figure 1 was calculated.
As the regression intercept, Jensen’s
alpha measures the average difference
between the market benchmark’s return
and the return of the firm (Alexander &
Francis, 1986), or abnormal return. If
Jensen’s alpha is not significantly differ-
ent from zero, then a firm’s stock perfor-
mance is the same as the market bench-
mark. Once calculated for each firm,
Jensen’s alpha is used as the dependent
variable in a cross-sectional analysis to
test independent variable effects. This ap-
plication of cross-sectional analysis al-
lows the association between an event
and abnormal returns to be observed
(Campbell, Lo, & MacKinlay, 1997).
Individual firm stock and market bench-
mark monthly rates of return were col-
lected from the CRSP database with the
S&P500® index serving as the market
benchmark.
Diversification. The relatedness of an
acquisition was measured as a categori-
cal entropy measure (Hoskisson, Hitt,
Johnson, & Moesel, 1993) where relat-
edness varies based on the degree that
target and acquiring firm primary four-
digit SIC codes match. An unrelated ac-
quisition (value = 0) is defined as the ac-
quisition of a target firm in a four-digit
SIC outside an acquiring firm’s two-digit
industry group. The first level of related
acquisitions occurs when an acquiring
and target firms two-digit industry groups
match (value = 1). Similarly, when an ac-
quiring and target firms SIC code matches
to three- and four-digits relatedness, val-
ues of two and three will be assigned re-
spectively.
Relative size. The relative size of
firms was calculated similar to Sirower
(1997) as the ratio of target firm market
Figure 1. Regression Model
where:
is the monthly rate of return of firm i during month t
is Jensen’s alpha for firm i
is a firm i’s stock price variance relative to the variance of the market benchmark (m)
is the monthly rate of return of the market benchmark (m) during month t
is the random error term
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capitalization divided by acquiring firm
market capitalization. Market capitali-
zation was calculated from either the
CRSP or Security Data Corporation
(SDC) database four weeks prior to an
acquisition announcement.
Acquisition Experience. Acquisition
experience was operationalized similar to
Hayward (2002) with an acquiring firm’s
acquisition experience recorded as the sum
of a firm’s acquisitions for the previous
three years. Acquisition experience was
measured prior high-technology acquisi-
tion experience of an acquirer in the three
years prior to the acquisition of interest.
Method of Accounting. The method
of accounting for an acquisition was mea-
sured by using a dichotomous dummy
variable (pooling = 0 and purchase = 1).
Information on method of accounting was
identified from either the SDC database
or an online search of business press.
R&D Expenditures. An acquirer’s
R&D expenditures were measured using
R&D intensity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989,
1990) minus the average R&D intensity
of firms in its industry to control for
industry effects (Dess, Ireland, & Hitt,
1990). The resulting relative R&D inten-
sity measure was averaged for the prior
three years to represent a firm’s level of
commitment to developing technological
capability, while controlling for annual
variation. Firm and industry R&D inten-
sity were calculated using data available
from COMPUSTAT: R&D expenditures
(data code 46) divided by sales (data code
12). Industry R&D intensity was calcu-
lated from COMPUSTAT by calculating
the average R&D intensity for all firms
with the same four-digit SIC code.
Acquiring Firm Debt. The level of
an acquiring firm’s debt was measured
using the current ratio. It was calculated
by dividing a firm’s current assets by
its current liabilities with data from
COMPUSTAT — data codes 4 and 5
respectively.
Form of Acquisition. The form of
acquisition, merger or tender offer, was
measured using a dichotomous dummy
variable (merger = 0 and tender offer =
1). Information on the form of an acquisi-
tion was identified from either the SDC
database or an online search of popular
business press.
Target Firm Performance. The in-
dustry adjusted profitability of a target
firm was measured by calculating a tar-
get firm’s Return-on-Sales (ROS) in the
year prior to its being acquired. Profit-
ability was measured using ROS for each
firm the year prior to an acquisition, and
was obtained from COMPUSTAT: net in-
come (data code 172) divided by sales
(data code 12).
Firm Environment. A firm’s environ-
ment was measured using the three en-
vironmental dimensions of munificence,
dynamism, and concentration computed
at the four-digit SIC level using the pro-
cedure described by Keats and Hitt
(1988) and calculated for the five pre-
ceding years, beginning in the year prior
to acquisition. Succinctly, munificence
is the average of the regression coeffi-
cients of a four-digit industry’s net sales
and operating income over the preced-
ing five-year period. Dynamism is the
average of the standard errors of the re-
gression slopes for the two munificence
regression equations. Complexity is a
market concentration measure computed
by regressing the terminal-year (i.e., year
five) market shares of the firms in a
given industry on these firms’ initial-year
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(i.e., year one) market shares. Note: lower
values on the complexity scale signify
higher levels of complexity.
Timing of Acquisition. The year, or time
impact, of an acquisition was measured
using a polychotomous dummy variable
(1995 = 1, 1996 = 2, and 1997 = 3) with
the year 1994 serving as the reference cat-
egory.
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ANALYSIS
be expected to exhibit autocorrelation
commonly associated with time series
data (see Griffiths, Hill, & Judge, 1993).
However, the cross-sectional analysis of
data over several years and the signifi-
cant difference between the year an ac-
quisition was made may indicate a vio-
lation of the constant variance assump-
tion (see Griffiths, Hall, & Judge, 1993).
Supplementary analysis using the
Goldfeld-Quandt F-test showed none of
the year-year and full model
combinations are significant. This suggests
that variance across the different years
is homoskedastic, or displays constant
variance.
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was
used to identify the significance and in-
dividual level of variance explained by
independent variables (Bray & Maxwell,
1985). Supplemental analysis was used to
determine if the assumptions (the same as
regression) of analytical technique were
met. Graphs of error terms were consis-
tent with conclusions that the are normally
distributed. Further, none of the variable
bivariate correlations exceeded .5, indicat-
ing that multicollinearity should not be
a concern (Gujarati, 1995, p. 335). The
data from independent firms over dif-
ferent time periods were combined in a
cross-sectional analysis, and would not
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ENDNOTES
5. We would like to thank Steven L.
Schooner of George Washington
University Law School for mak-
ing this observation.
6. A single F-117 mission can ac-
complish today what 95 sorties
achieved during Vietnam or what
4,500 B-17 bombers achieved
during WWII (Toffler & Toffler,
1993).
1. Please see the Appendix for a de-
scription of the study’s methodol-
ogy.
2. The authors were unable to confirm
that Tinsley was ever divested from
ASM Lithography.
3. The potential implication is that ex-
isting M&A research may be biased
by model under-specification (see
Griffiths, Hill, & Judge, 1993: 312).
4. The Financial Accounting Standards
Board eliminated pooling of inter-
ests accounting and modified re-
cording of goodwill with purchase
accounting for all acquisitions com-
pleted after July 1, 2001.
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